PROTRACTED DISPLACEMENT STUDY:
AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE MAIN DISTRICTS OF DISPLACEMENT
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INTRODUCTION

In November 2018, the International Organization for Migration's (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Unit, the Returns Working Group (RWG), and Social Inquiry, with input and support from the Ministry of Migration and Displacement (MoMD) within the Federal Government of Iraq, published an in-depth analysis on “Reasons to Remain: Categorizing Protracted Displacement in Iraq”. The aim of this report was to build a categorization framework for protracted displacement as the basis for future study, monitoring and policy development in relation to the resolution of internal displacement across all populations affected by the conflict in Iraq.

While the report defined categories of obstacles to return and provided estimates of the proportion of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) falling in each of the categories, it did not identify where the IDPs facing these obstacles can be found, and most importantly, where they are from. To address this, IOM DTM completed an analysis of the remaining out-of-camp IDP population in areas of displacement along multiple indicators, which allowed for the identification of their reasons and obstacles for non-return as well as their displacement situation. DTM also completed a similar and complementary analysis on IDPs’ main areas of origin, presented in the document “Protracted Displacement Study: An In-Depth Analysis of the Main Districts of Origin”. Although some of the analysis touches upon the situation of in-camp IDPs, two factors led to the decision to focus most of the analysis on out-of-camp IDPs. Firstly, the secondary data review showed that the knowledge base on in-camp IDPs was significantly greater than that of out-of-camp IDPs. Moreover, our analysis showed that these two groups face quite different displacement situations, leading to the decision to analyze them separately and prioritize analysis of the situation of out-of-camp IDPs.

As IDPs are dispersed across over 3,000 locations in more than 100 districts of displacement, the analysis focused on the districts containing the majority of the IDP caseload. Using the latest available DTM dataset at the time of the analysis (Dec 2018), it was found that 83% of all out-of-camp IDPs can be found in the top 21 districts of displacement, and 90% in the top 32 districts across 14 governorates. While all 32 districts were analyzed to better understand protracted displacement, only the top 21 will presented here as the main districts of displacement in the format of a factsheet following a common structure to facilitate comparison. This reference note, containing an overall presentation of the analyzed indicators and key findings, aims to explain and complement the factsheets.
## ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DTM</td>
<td>Displacement Tracking Matrix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHH</td>
<td>Female-Headed Household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH</td>
<td>Household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLP</td>
<td>Housing, Land and Property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HoH</td>
<td>Head of Household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILA</td>
<td>Integrated Location Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IQD</td>
<td>Iraqi Dinar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KI</td>
<td>Key Informant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KRI</td>
<td>Kurdistan Region of Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCNA</td>
<td>Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMD</td>
<td>Ministry of Migration and Displacement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWG</td>
<td>Returns Working Group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DEFINITIONS

Female-Headed Household (FHH) – The head of the household is a female and is recognized by the members of the household as the head of the unit.

Household (HH) – A domestic unit consisting of present and absent members who are related by blood or law (i.e. marriage, adoption) who live together or used to live together before the crisis in the same dwelling and share meals. The average household size in Iraq consists of six members, as per the government’s estimates.

Head of Household (HoH) – The individual in the household who provides support and maintenance to one or more individuals related to him/her by blood or law ties.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) – According to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, internally displaced persons are “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border” (United Nations, 1998). In the current context, DTM considers all Iraqis who were forced to flee from 1 January 2014 onwards and are living in a different location than of origin as IDPs.

Intra-District Displacement – IDPs who are settled within their district of origin.

Intra-Governorate Displacement – IDPs who are settled within their governorate of origin.

Key Informant (KI) – The DTM collects data on numbers and locations of IDPs and returnees using an extended network of over 9,500 key informants. Community leaders, mukhtars, local authorities and security forces make up most of the key informants.

Location – The unit of reference or the observation unit in the Master Lists and assessments, where data collection takes place. A location is defined as a camp, a village in rural areas or a quarter (neighbourhood) in urban areas and its boundaries are determined on the basis of key informants and teams’ knowledge.

Rate of Change – The percentage decrease/increase in the number of IDPs settled within a district between May 2018 and December 2018.

Rate of Return – The proportion of returnees originally from a governorate/district to the sum of returnees and IDPs originally from the same governorate/district.

Returnee – All those previously displaced since January 2014 who returned to their location of origin, irrespective of whether they have returned to their former residence or to another shelter type. The definition of returnee is not related to the criteria of returning in safety and dignity, nor with a defined strategy of durable solution.

Vulnerable & Extra-Vulnerable Household – Household that exhibits a special vulnerability, such as female-headed household, minor-headed household, household including at least one member with disabilities, and household where more than two to three of members are dependants (less than 14 years old or over 60). A household where more than one of the above conditions applies were considered as extra-vulnerable.
DISTRICT PROFILING

Each factsheet creates a profile of the district based on multiple indicators, such as its IDP population size, the rate of change in IDP population, and the demographics of the IDPs in terms of their districts of origin, length of displacement, and ethno-religious composition. The profiling categories and criteria are defined as follows:

District IDP Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High recipient</td>
<td>District hosting 10% or more of the total caseload of out-of-camp IDPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium recipient</td>
<td>District hosting between 3% and 10% of the total caseload of out-of-camp IDPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low recipient</td>
<td>District hosting less than 3% of the total caseload of out-of-camp IDPs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rate of Change in IDP Population

Relates to the proportion of IDPs who have moved in or out of the district of displacement between May and December 2018. A minus (-) sign in front of the percentage indicates a decrease of IDPs while a plus (+) sign indicates inflow of IDPs during the reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stationary</td>
<td>District with a rate of change for the displaced population of less than 10%, indicating that IDPs are not (or only very slowly) moving out of their location of displacement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly stationary</td>
<td>District with a rate of change for the displaced population between 10% and 20%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly dynamic</td>
<td>District with a rate of change for the displaced population between 20% and 30%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamic</td>
<td>District with a rate of change for the displaced population above 30%, indicating that IDPs have been rapidly or very rapidly moving out of their location of displacement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### IDP Districts of Origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Homogeneous</th>
<th>District in which 80% or more of the IDPs come from the same district of origin.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fairly homogeneous</td>
<td>District in which 50% to 80% of the IDPs come from the same district of origin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterogeneous</td>
<td>District with no majority group found in terms of district of origin.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### IDP Length of Displacement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Homogeneous</th>
<th>District in which 80% or more of the IDPs were displaced within the same time period.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fairly homogeneous</td>
<td>District in which 50% to 80% of the IDPs were displaced within the same time period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterogeneous</td>
<td>District with no majority group found in terms of length of displacement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protracted displacement</td>
<td>IDPs who fled between January 2014 and March 2016 - i.e. during the first 5 waves.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### IDP Ethno-Religious Composition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Homogeneous</th>
<th>District in which 80% or more of the IDPs belong to the same ethno-religious group.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fairly homogeneous</td>
<td>District in which 50% to 80% of the IDPs belong to the same ethno-religious group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterogeneous</td>
<td>District with no majority group found in terms of ethno-religious composition.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### IDP Intentions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Short/medium term</th>
<th>Refers to a definite time period, in this case within 12 months of the assessment.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long term</td>
<td>Refers to an indefinite time period, in this case 12 months or more after the assessment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
METHODOLOGY

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The primary objective of this analysis is to support durable solutions by contributing to the knowledge base on protracted displacement.

The target population is the displaced population in the 32 main districts of displacement. The main focus is on out-of-camp IDPs, although a brief profile of in-camp IDPs is also provided.

To provide an overview of the issues these population groups are facing with regard to returning to their location of origin, the assessment sought to achieve the following objectives:

1. Complement the categorisation framework for protracted displacement by providing a geographical and demographic component to ensure it is actionable and usable by the humanitarian community.
2. Provide a more granular picture of the main districts of displacement, allowing us to better understand the specific push and pull factors IDPs are facing, as well as the socio-demographic characteristics of the IDP caseload for each analysed district.

DATA SOURCES

Different data sources were used to conduct this analysis, namely the DTM Baselines (Round 107, Round 106 and Round 96), the Integrated Location Assessment (ILA) III, the Return Index (Round 2 – October 2018) and Multi Cluster Needs Assessment (MCNA) VI implemented by REACH in collaboration with 18 operational partners between July and August 2018.

Main characteristics of each data source are summarized in the below table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATA SOURCE</th>
<th>COMPLETION OF DATA COLLECTION</th>
<th>METHODOLOGY</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>COVERAGE</th>
<th>INDICATORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ILA III</td>
<td>May 2018</td>
<td>Key informants</td>
<td>248,632 out-of-camp IDP HHs</td>
<td>99% of locations</td>
<td>District of displacement, district of origin, length of displacement (wave), ethno-religious composition, intentions in the long term, obstacles to return and reasons to stay, rate of change</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Round 107   | December 2018                 | Key informants | 209,254 out-of-camp IDP HHs; 91,218 in-camp IDP HHs | 99% of locations | Distri
| Round 106   | October 2018                  | Key informants | 217,997 out-of-camp IDP HHs | 97% of locations | District of displacement, rate of change |
| Round 96    | May 2018                      | Key informants | 99,655 in-camp HHs | 98% of locations | District of displacement for camp population |
| Return Index #2 | October 2018              | Key informants | 694,220 returnee HHs | 98% of locations | Blocked returns, severity index |
### Challenges and Limitations

The use of different data sources yields challenges related to the different data collection methods, timings and definitions of indicators for each source.

Indicators from DTM sources rely on a KI methodology, which provides the prevalent figure at location level (weighted with the overall number of IDPs or returnees present at the location), while indicators from the MCNA are weighted estimates of a statistically representative household survey administered across 72 districts within 16 governorates. Different timings and different definitions of indicators (in particular for intentions and obstacles to return) also highlighted discrepancies/inconsistencies in the information provided by the main sources. For example, long-term intentions in ILA are defined as “over 12 months”, whereas MCNA collects intentions in the short term (less than 3 months) and in the long term (within 12 months). For clarity, intentions collected in MCNA have been grouped under the label “short/medium” and intentions collected in ILA were labelled as “long-term”. As for obstacles, the list of categories is slightly different with MCNA, including more options compared to ILA and a specific category for endured “fear/trauma”.

The integration of findings must therefore be handled with extreme care. This is particularly important for dynamic districts where the situation is rapidly evolving and the population of interest – IDPs who have not yet returned – may have changed greatly since the assessment/data collection took place.¹

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¹ Evidence from previous ILAs suggests that it is often more vulnerable IDPs who are left behind permanently in displacement due to their poor conditions i.e. they have lost everything back home and/or have no means to return. Hence, the conditions of current IDPs may be worse than those portrayed in ILA III.
KEY FINDINGS

- **Districts with higher concentration of IDPs**: The two districts of Mosul and Erbil are the “main” recipients of current IDPs; together they host around one third of the total caseload of out-of-camp IDPs. Another third of out-of-camp IDPs are settled in the five districts of Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyyah, Sumel, Tikrit and Zakho (denoted as “medium” recipients, each hosting a share between 3% and 7%). The remaining third is hosted in 25 districts – denoted as “low” recipients, each hosting below 3% of the total IDPs.

- **Ethno-religious composition**: All the districts display homogeneity, to a degree, with regard to the main characteristics of hosted IDPs, given that the bulk of IDPs are Arab Sunnis. One of the strongest pull factor for clustering is ethno-religious affiliation. In 20 districts, over 80% of the population belongs to one group (18 districts Arab Sunnis, 1 Turkmen Shia and 1 Yazidi), while in another 10 there is a prevalent group accounting for between 51% and 79% of households.

- **Districts of origin**: Six districts could be rated as “homogeneous” in terms of the IDPs’ districts of origin – 80% or more of the population originates from the same district – namely Akre, Al-Fares, Al-Musayab, Balad, Najaf and Tooz; and another 11 rated as “fairly homogeneous” – Al-Shikhan, Daquq, Diwaniya, Falluja, Kerbala, Khanaqin, Mosul, Sinjar, Sumel, Tikrit and Tilkaif – where a consistent prevalent group is present (between 51% and 79%). The remaining districts host a mixed population.

- **Length of displacement**: Three districts are “homogeneous” – Kerbala, Mosul and Sinjar – meaning they have displaced populations that have near identical durations of displacement while 13 are “fairly homogeneous” – Akre, Al-Musayab, Al-Shikhan, Ba‘quba, Dahuk, Diwaniya, Falluja, Khanaqin, Najaf, Ramadi, Sinjar, Sumel and Tooz. In most cases, they match with homogeneous districts according to origin, outlining how similar groups of IDPs may have fled together.

- **Movement and intentions**: In general, IDPs in the main 32 districts are not (or only very slowly) moving out of their location of displacement (15% have left their district of displacement since May 2018). This figure aligns with the assessed intentions to return in the short-medium term (the national figure is 13%). It shows how, despite the strong will to return in the long term (74%), staying appears to be the most realistic solution for nearly 90% of IDPs, at least over the next 12 months.

- **Stationary versus dynamic districts**: Significant differences in the rate of change were noted at district level. Aside from the district of Chamchamal in Sulaymaniyyah, IDPs are not (or only very slowly) moving out of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), making those districts stationary. Other stationary districts include Al-Musayab, Ba‘quba, Kirkuk, Falluja, Khanaqin, Mosul, Sinjar and Tooz. On the other hand, a rapid decrease in the number of IDPs was assessed in all districts of Baghdad, Kifri and Tikrit in Salah al-Din, Ramadi in Anbar and Telafar in Ninewa, making them dynamic districts.

- **Obstacles to return**: The analysis of main obstacles to return helps understand the extreme variability in the rate of change and the “gap” between intentions in the short-medium and long term, especially if stationary and dynamic districts are compared. IDPs in stationary districts were more likely to report the destruction of former residences, the lack of HLP documentation and fear due to the ethno-religious change in their location of origin. In contrast, IDPs in dynamic districts generally reported lower levels of residential damage and better security in their location of origin – their greatest obstacle to return is the lack of employment/livelihood opportunities in their location of origin.

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2 There is evidence of clustering of IDPs in locations of displacement: Sunnis in Erbil; Shias in Diwaniya, Kerbala and Najaf; Turkmens in Kirkuk and Tooz; Yazidis in Sumel and Sinjar; Christians and Kakais in Dahuk and Erbil; Shabak Sunnis in Akre and Al-Shikhan.

3 The variability of displacement was assessed through the rate of change in the number of IDPs between Round 107 (December 2018) and ILA III (May 2018). Districts where displaced households are not or are very slowly moving out of their location of displacement have been rated as “stationary” (the rate of change is between -10% and +10%) or “fairly stationary” (rate of change = 10%-20%); while districts where families are moving out at a faster pace were rated as “fairly dynamic” (rate of change = 20%-30%) or “dynamic” (rate of change > 30%).

4 The intentions to integrate within the host community in the long-term was reported more frequently in the three districts of Baghdad, generally in KRI and also in Kerbala and Kirkuk.

5 In stationary districts, one in two families fled during summer 2014 (versus one in five in dynamic districts), and Kurdish Sunnis, Yazidis, Shabaks and Christians represent one third of the population (versus 6% in dynamic districts).
- **Risk of pushed returns**: It should be observed that decreases in the number of IDPs do not correlate with voluntary – and successful – returns in all cases. According to ILA III, IDPs in dynamic districts were more likely to report, “pushed returns, evictions, and/or suspended salaries compared”. The issue of pushed returns is particularly significant in Abu Ghrabi and Adhamia, in Baghdad Governorate, where the evidence of unstable returns – i.e. IDPs who are displaced again after returning to their location of origin – was also assessed.

- **Intra-district displacement**: Another important categorization relates to intra-district displacement, i.e. IDPs settled within their district of origin. In nine districts – Al-Musayab, Balad, Daquq, Khanaqin, Mosul, Sinjar, Tjilkaif, Telafar and Tooz – their share is between 47% and 99% of total IDPs. Despite being so geographically close, these IDPs are not (or only very slowly) returning home: the rate of change since May 2018 in these districts is -10%. With the exception of Mosul – where the physical consequences of the conflict on the western side of the city triggered a significant intra-city displacement towards the eastern side – one common factor can be observed: these locations have a higher likelihood of experiencing community tensions, including fear of revenge or retaliatory acts that may prevent some groups from returning. In fact, the contextual situation in these districts makes the IDPs’ return subject to changes in local dynamics.

- **Vulnerability**: Other characteristics of IDPs in protracted displacement are challenging to categorize and point to the fact that it is often the most vulnerable who are left behind. Not only have many families lost everything back home (including property and assets), but also the limited access to employment (31% of HHs reported obstacles to find work) makes them particularly vulnerable, dependent on community/friends/family assistance (14%), savings (13%) and loans/debts (19%); in other words, unable to return.

- **High share of female-headed households (FHH)**: The high number of Iraqi casualties in the conflict years – the vast majority of whom have been males – have also impacted on the share of female-headed households in a context where female participation in the labour force has historically been and is still low, and where females who lead households face heightened bureaucratic obstacles and social stigma in the return process. According to MCNA, the national figure of FHH for out-of-camp IDPs is 16%, with peaks of 33% among families settled in Abu-Ghrabi and Tikrit.

- **Population in camps**: If vulnerabilities impact on the IDPs’ will to return to their location of origin, particular attention should also be given to households living in formal camp settings. Although in-camp IDPs have been in displacement for less time than IDPs out of camps (43% for 3 years or more versus 61% for IDPs out of camps), they are more stationary – only 8% have moved out since May 2018. Of all the 32 main districts of displacement, only in Daquq, Karkh, Ramadi, Tikrit and Tjilkaif have over 40% of IDPs moved out since last spring. The MCNA indicated that the highest proportion of households with humanitarian needs can be found among IDPs in camps, who are also the least likely to cite employment as a primary source of income and who are dependent on various types of assistance.

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6 According to MCNA, one in two families reported damage/ destruction of former homes (with peaks of around 85% among IDPs settled in Kerbala and Tooz) and one in ten damage/theft of assets (42% in Kerbala and 27% in Tooz).

7 According to MCNA, over one in two families settled in Falluja and Telafar reported loans/debts among main sources of income; the figure is one in three families in Chamchamal, Ramadi and Sinjar.

8 According to 2018 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MIC56), the national figure for female-headed households in Iraq is 9%.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th># of IDP HHs</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Length of Displacement</th>
<th>Rate of Change</th>
<th># of Camps</th>
<th>Type of Camps</th>
<th>Composition of Idp Camps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ninewa</td>
<td>4,714</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Stationary</td>
<td>Dynamic</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Fairly homogeneous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirkuk</td>
<td>2,213</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Fairly stationary</td>
<td>Fairly stationary</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Fairly homogeneous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salah al-Din</td>
<td>5,318</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balad</td>
<td>1,253</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Fairly stationary</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulaymaniyah</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Stationary</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samarra</td>
<td>18,192</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>Fairly stationary</td>
<td>Fairly stationary</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diwaniya</td>
<td>1,567</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakho</td>
<td>2,922</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Fairly stationary</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninewa</td>
<td>3,903</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Shikhan</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tilkaif</td>
<td>17,049</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>Fairly stationary</td>
<td>Fairly stationary</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Shikhan</td>
<td>3,243</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
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<td>Falluja</td>
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## Table 2: Additional indicators of 32 main districts of displacement

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<th>Percentage of Adults</th>
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<th>Percentage of People Missing Civil Documents</th>
<th>Percentage of People with Missing Health Documents</th>
<th>Percentage of People with Missing Labor Documents</th>
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**FALLUJA DISTRICT, ANBAR**

Out-of-Camp IDPs in Falluja District

### IDP MOVEMENT

Falluja is a “stationary” district. Only 5% of IDPs have left the location of displacement since May 2018 and these movements are mainly intra-district. Most of IDPs in Fallujah are from Babylon and nearly all IDPs in the district are in protracted displacement. Their movements are related to the military operations that occurred in October 2014 in Babylon and to the secondary movement of IDPs from Anbar up until the spring of 2016.

### IDP INTENTIONS

**Short/Medium Term** (less than 12 months)

- 78% want to stay

**Long Term** (more than 12 months)

- 100% want to return

### IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

- 69% Al-Musayab
- 29% Falluja
- 2% Ramadi

### DISTRICT IDP POPULATION

- 1,577 Households
- (1% of total out-of-camp IDPs)

### RATE OF CHANGE IN IDP POPULATION

- 5% IDPs in the District
- (May – Dec 2018)

### IDP ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

- 100% Arab Sunni

### DISTRICT OF DISPLACEMENT PROFILE 1
According to key informants, returns of Al-Musayab IDPs are still not permitted due to tribal and political issues related to the population composition of the area. Returns to around 70% of locations in Falluja and around 50% of those in Ramadi are also obstructed by security forces, and families are prevented from returning due to perceived affiliation to extremist groups. When directly assessed, families reported home destruction/damage (57%), discrimination (38%) and fear/trauma (31%) as reasons not to return.

Key Obstacles to Return

- Social Cohesion
- House Destruction
- Livelihoods and Services
- Mental Health
- Security
- Security

These households also exhibit many other vulnerabilities: one in four is headed by a female and the same share has at least one member with disabilities. Nearly all (79%) are missing HLP documentation and 16% do not have civil documentation. In addition, 21% of children under two years have not received the Penta3 vaccine, 15% of those under five years have not been vaccinated against measles and 12% have not been vaccinated against polio; 26% of children aged 6–11 years are not attending mandatory education.

**Conditions in Displacement**

Households who remain in Falluja appear to be particularly vulnerable. These families have one of the lowest monthly median income of all districts: IQD 5,278 (76% of HHs reported a monthly family income per capita below 20,000 IQD) and key informants report that nearly all families lack the funds necessary to return. Obstacles to work were reported by half of families; only 44% currently receive income through employment, 62% are taking on loans and debts and only 8% still rely on savings. Around one third are supported by families/friends, 13% by NGOs/charities and 7% by social services. Regarding housing, 79% are settled in critical shelters (according to MCNA, mostly tents) and 21% are hosted by other families. Other coping strategies used by some IDPs are selling assistance that they have received (4%) and/or household assets (2%).

**Presence of In-Camp IDPs**

- **3 Camps** in district
- **6,354 Households** (6.97% of total in-camp IDPs)
- **-12% Rate of Change** (May – Dec 2018)
IDP MOVEMENT

The displacement situation in the district appears to be "stationary": the only change assessed since May 2018 is a minimal increase in the number of IDPs (1%). Nearly all the displacement occurred during two consecutive waves: 77% during June-July 2014 and 19% in August 2014.

As of December 2018, Babylon Governorate remains the only governorate that has not experienced any return of its displaced population – most of them originating from Jurf al-Shakhar and Iskandria areas. Virtually all intra-district IDPs from this area are Sunni Arabs and have been displaced for more than four years. Returns to their areas of origin remains contingent on the security configuration present there.
The main reason why IDPs do not intend to return is linked to the situation in Jurf al-Sakhar, their town of origin. The town was retaken in October 2014, and residents have not been allowed back due to tribal and political issues related to the population composition of the area. As a result, returns to their location of origin are neither allowed nor safe. According to key informants, blocked returns are the top obstacle. Families also mentioned house destruction/damage (55%), fear/trauma (29%), lack of money (28%) and discrimination (24%) as obstacles to return.

Key Obstacles to Return

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Cohesion</th>
<th>House Destruction</th>
<th>Livelihoods and Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The median monthly income (per capita) is 70,000 IQD. Employment is one of the main sources of income for nearly 80% of households, only 10% reported obstacles to find work and no families are living in critical shelters. However, 14% mentioned debts and loans among their main sources of income. This points to the fact that families may be financially exhausted by the long years of displacement (nearly all families fled in summer 2014) and – even if some have resettled with relatives and friends – they are hardly hosted for free but have to bear the costs of a rent (96%).

PRESENCE OF IN-CAMP IDPs

No in-camp IDPs
KARKH DISTRICT, BAGHDAD
Out-of-Camp IDPs in Karkh District

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

The IDPs’ initial displacements can be mainly linked to the first major movement of people from Anbar and successive waves of displacement during the retaking of that governorate from ISIL, including continuing displacement movements of Anbar IDPs. Karkh can be considered a “dynamic” district as the situation of IDPs has changed a lot. Since the spring of 2018 nearly half of IDPs have moved out – especially those from Al-Ka‘im, Mosul and Telafar.

IDP INTENTIONS

According to both key informants and families, destruction of former residence, together with lack of money and employment/livelihood prospects at the location of origin are the top three obstacles to return. Consequently, the loss of “everything back home” coupled with better services in displacement are the main reasons to stay – often in addition to the lack of money to pay for the return trip and, to a lesser extent, the presence of relatives/friends who also relocated in Karkh.

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

38% Ramadi 14% Mosul
19% Al-Ka‘im 12% Other
17% Falluja

IDP LENGTH OF DISPLACEMENT

88% Protracted
23% Jun – Jul 2014
25% Apr 2015 – Mar 2016
17% Sept 2014 – Apr 2015
15% Pre-Jun 2014
20% Other

IDP ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

94% Arab Sunni
4% Turkmen Shia
2% Arab Shia

DISTRICT IDP POPULATION

4,714 Households
(2% of total out-of-camp IDPs)

RATE OF CHANGE IN IDP POPULATION

-47% IDPs in the District
(May – Dec 2018)

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

38% Ramadi 14% Mosul
19% Al-Ka‘im 12% Other
17% Falluja

Heterogeneous

IDP ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

94% Arab Sunni
4% Turkmen Shia
2% Arab Shia

Homogeneous

IDP LENGTH OF DISPLACEMENT

88% Protracted
23% Jun – Jul 2014
25% Apr 2015 – Mar 2016
17% Sept 2014 – Apr 2015
15% Pre-Jun 2014
20% Other

Fairly Homogeneous

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

38% Ramadi 14% Mosul
19% Al-Ka‘im 12% Other
17% Falluja

Heterogeneous

IDP ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

94% Arab Sunni
4% Turkmen Shia
2% Arab Shia

Homogeneous

DISTRICT IDP POPULATION

4,714 Households
(2% of total out-of-camp IDPs)

RATE OF CHANGE IN IDP POPULATION

-47% IDPs in the District
(May – Dec 2018)

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

38% Ramadi 14% Mosul
19% Al-Ka‘im 12% Other
17% Falluja

Heterogeneous

IDP ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

94% Arab Sunni
4% Turkmen Shia
2% Arab Shia

Homogeneous

IDP LENGTH OF DISPLACEMENT

88% Protracted
23% Jun – Jul 2014
25% Apr 2015 – Mar 2016
17% Sept 2014 – Apr 2015
15% Pre-Jun 2014
20% Other

Fairly Homogeneous

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

38% Ramadi 14% Mosul
19% Al-Ka‘im 12% Other
17% Falluja

Heterogeneous

IDP ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

94% Arab Sunni
4% Turkmen Shia
2% Arab Shia

Homogeneous

IDP LENGTH OF DISPLACEMENT

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23% Jun – Jul 2014
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IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

38% Ramadi 14% Mosul
19% Al-Ka‘im 12% Other
17% Falluja

Heterogeneous

IDP ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

94% Arab Sunni
4% Turkmen Shia
2% Arab Shia

Homogeneous

IDP LENGTH OF DISPLACEMENT

88% Protracted
23% Jun – Jul 2014
25% Apr 2015 – Mar 2016
17% Sept 2014 – Apr 2015
15% Pre-Jun 2014
20% Other

Heterogeneous
**KARKH DISTRICT, BAGHDAD**

Out-of-Camp IDPs in Karkh District

**VULNERABILITIES**

According to key informants, house destruction/damage, lack of employment opportunities at their location of origin and lack of funds are the top three obstacles to return. During household surveys, families also reported house destruction/damage (63%), no money (49%) and no livelihood-generating income (28%) as obstacles to return.

**OBSTACLES TO RETURN**

According to key informants, house destruction/damage, lack of employment opportunities at their location of origin and lack of funds are the top three obstacles to return. During household surveys, families also reported house destruction/damage (63%), no money (49%) and no livelihood-generating income (28%) as obstacles to return.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Obstacles to Return</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Cohesion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House Destruction</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental Health</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihoods and Services</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**CONDITIONS IN DISPLACEMENT**

Living conditions seem better than average: the median monthly income is IQD 100,000, around 40% are hosted by other families, there are few obstacles to work (8%) and employment is one of the main sources of income for 90% of households. Less than 20% are borrowing money or buying on credit and 15% are supported by family/friends.

Overall, there was a lower share of households with specific vulnerabilities/concerns. Nevertheless, 20% of households are female headed and 21% have at least one member with disabilities.

**PRESENCE OF IN-CAMP IDPs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts of Origin</th>
<th>0 Camps in district</th>
<th>0 Households (0% of total in-camp IDPs)</th>
<th>-100% Rate of Change (May – Dec 2018)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

DAHUK DISTRICT, DAHUK
Out-of-Camp IDPs in Dahuk District

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

Dahuk appears to have a “stationary” population, as only 7% of IDPs have moved out since the spring of 2018 – mostly from Al-Hamdaniya and a few from Mosul and Sinjar.

IDP MOVEMENT

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

50% Mosul
30% Sinjar
20% Other

Heterogeneous

IDP LENGTH OF DISPLACEMENT

98% Protracted
51% Aug 2014
46% Jun – Jul 2014
3% Other

Homogeneous

IDP ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

59% Kurdish Sunni
18% Arab Sunni
11% Yazidi
12% Other

Homogeneous

DISTRICT IDP POPULATION

6,151 Households
(3% of total out-of-camp IDPs)

Low Recipient
Medium Recipient
High Recipient

RATE OF CHANGE IN IDP POPULATION

-7% IDPs in the District
(May – Dec 2018)

Stationary
Fairly Stationary
Fairly Dynamic
Dynamic

IDP INTENTIONS

Short/Medium Term (less than 12 months)
76% want to stay

Long Term (more than 12 months)
64% want to return
DAHUK DISTRICT, DAHUK

Out-of-Camp IDPs in Dahuk District

VULNERABILITIES

OBSTACLES TO RETURN

The top three obstacles to return reported by both key informants and families were: widespread destruction of former homes, fear/trauma and lack of security at the location of origin. Around 35% of families also mentioned discrimination and 27% the presence of mines. Resettling in the district has been supported by incentives provided by government authorities.

Key Obstacles to Return

- Social Cohesion
- House Destruction
- Livelihoods and Services
- Mental Health
- Security
- Lack of Security Forces
- House Damaged / Destroyed
- Fear / Trauma
- Discrimination
- Presence of Mines

Figure 1. Key Obstacles to Return

CONDITIONS IN DISPLACEMENT

Living conditions in Dahuk are slightly better than in other districts: access to education is very high (only 6% of children aged 6–11 years are not attending school) and the median monthly income per capita is above average at IQD 71,429. However, the cost of living in KRI is high – 88% of households are living in rented housing and shelter (rent and utilities) was reported as the primary reason to take on debts. Moreover, access to employment is difficult: around 40% of households reported that at least one member faced obstacles to find work. As a result, families struggle to sustain expenses and 26% of households are taking on loans/debts, 23% are supported by family/friends, 15% are spending their savings and 4% are selling household assets.

Another source for concern is the high percentage of households with at least one family member with disabilities (27% versus an overall average of 19%). It should also be noted that 66% of households are missing HLP documents and 14% have no civil documentation (the national averages are 50% and 8% respectively).

PRESENCE OF IN-CAMP IDPs

No in-camp IDPs
SUMEL DISTRICT, DAHUK
Out-of-Camp IDPs in Sumel District

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

The situation in the district can be defined as “stationary”. Only 7% of IDPs have left since the spring of 2018 including all of the families originally from Al-Hamdiya, half of those from Telafar and one quarter of those from Al-Ba’aj. However, families from Al-Ba’aj have presumably not returned home but moved to other areas of Sinjar, where they can enjoy a safer security situation.

IDP MOVEMENT

The situation in the district can be defined as “stationary”. Only 7% of IDPs have left since the spring of 2018 including all of the families originally from Al-Hamdiya, half of those from Telafar and one quarter of those from Al-Ba’aj. However, families from Al-Ba’aj have presumably not returned home but moved to other areas of Sinjar, where they can enjoy a safer security situation.

IDP INTENTIONS

Short/Medium Term (less than 12 months)

- 68% want to stay

Long Term (more than 12 months)

- 67% want to return

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

50% Sinjar
5% Telafar
31% Mosul
4% Tilkaif
10% Al-Ba’aj

Homogeneous
Fairly Homogeneous
Heterogeneous

IDP ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

56% Yazidi
33% Kurdish Sunni
9% Arab Sunni
2% Christian

Homogeneous
Fairly Homogeneous
Heterogeneous

DISTRICT IDP POPULATION

14,750 Households
(7% of total out-of-camp IDPs)

Low Recipient
Medium Recipient
High Recipient

RATE OF CHANGE IN IDP POPULATION

-7% IDPs in the District
(May – Dec 2018)

Stationary
Fairly Stationary
Fairly Dynamic
Dynamic

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

50% Sinjar
5% Telafar
31% Mosul
4% Tilkaif
10% Al-Ba’aj

Homogeneous
Fairly Homogeneous
Heterogeneous

IDP LENGTH OF DISPLACEMENT

96% Protracted
68% Aug 2014
28% Jun – Jul 2014
4% Post-Jul 2017

Homogeneous
Fairly Homogeneous
Heterogeneous

IDP ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

56% Yazidi
33% Kurdish Sunni
9% Arab Sunni
2% Christian

Homogeneous
Fairly Homogeneous
Heterogeneous
OBSTACLES TO RETURN

The findings regarding key obstacles to return are related to the ethno-religious affiliation of IDPs. The district hosts Yazidis (56%), Kurdish Sunnis (33%), Arab Sunnis (9%) and Christians (2%). According to key informants, the main obstacles to return are “fear linked to the changed ethno-religious composition at the place of origin”, house destruction/damage and fear of losing humanitarian assistance. When directly assessed, families mainly reported house damage (46%), lack of security forces at the location of origin (42%) and fear/trauma (34%).

Key Obstacles to Return

- Social Cohesion
- House Destruction
- Livelihoods and Services
- Mental Health
- Security

CONDITIONS IN DISPLACEMENT

The median monthly income per capita is IQD 56,250, obstacles to work are widespread (reported by 38% of households), 27% of families are taking on loans/debts and 42% live in critical shelters. On the other hand, access to education seems good – only 6% of children aged 6–11 years are not attending school.

Another source for concern is the high percentage of households that lack HLP documentation (68% versus an overall average of 50%), which is linked to the high share of IDPs originally from Sinjar, an area which has a documented history of property rights issues. Around 10% of families also reported that they did not have any civil documentation. Households in Sumel were also slightly more likely to report the presence of family members with disabilities (24% versus 19% overall).
**ZAKHO DISTRICT, DAHUK**

*Out-of-Camp IDPs in Zakho District*

**IDP MOVEMENT**

Only 2% of IDPs have moved out since the spring of 2018 and there have only been small changes to the composition of IDPs. All IDPs from Al Ba’aj have left, presumably embarking on secondary displacement as return to Al Ba’aj is very difficult. It is highly likely that families originally from Al-Ba’aj are moving to other areas of Sinjar, where they can enjoy a safer security situation, instead of returning to their location of origin.

**IDP INTENTIONS**

| Short/Medium Term (less than 12 months) | 87% want to stay |
| Long Term (more than 12 months) | 67% want to return |

**DISTRICT IDP POPULATION**

- 9,445 Households (5% of total out-of-camp IDPs)
  - Low Recipient
  - Medium Recipient
  - High Recipient

**RATE OF CHANGE IN IDP POPULATION**

- -2% IDPs in the District (May – Dec 2018)
  - Stationary
  - Fairly Stationary
  - Fairly Dynamic
  - Dynamic

**IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN**

- 43% Sinjar
- 30% Telafar
- 26% Mosul
- 1% Tilkaif
  - Homogeneous
  - Fairly Homogeneous
  - Heterogeneous

**IDP LENGTH OF DISPLACEMENT**

- 74% Protracted
  - 50% Aug 2014
  - 26% Post-Jul 2017
  - 22% Jun – Jul 2014
  - 2% Post-Apr 2015
  - Homogeneous
  - Fairly Homogeneous
  - Heterogeneous

**IDP ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION**

- 73% Kurdish Sunni
- 18% Yazidi
- 4% Arab Sunni
- 4% Christian
- 1% Turkmen Sunni
  - Homogeneous
  - Fairly Homogeneous
  - Heterogeneous
ZAKHO DISTRICT, DAHUK
Out-of-Camp IDPs in Zakho District

VULNERABILITIES

OBSTACLES TO RETURN

According to key informants, the destruction of former residences, “fear linked to the changed ethno-religious composition” and lack of security at the place of origin are the main obstacles to return. There is also evidence that returns to around 40% of locations in Telafar are being obstructed, 15% of those in Mosul and 15% of those in Sinjar – the three main districts of origin of IDPs in Zakho. When directly assessed, over 80% of families reported that they lacked HLP documentation, while nearly 60% stated the lack of security forces at origin as one of the main obstacles to their return.

Key Obstacles to Return

- Social Cohesion
- House Destruction
- Livelihoods and Services
- Mental Health
- Security

CONDITIONS IN DISPLACEMENT

The living conditions of IDPs in Zakho appear to be worse compared to other districts and also to other IDPs settled in Dahuk. The median monthly income per capita is 41,667 IQD and employment revenues seem insufficient as 23% of households are taking on loans/debts and 11% are spending their savings. There are frequent barriers to employment: in 38% of households at least one family member reported obstacles to find work. Families also reported sale of household assets (2%) and illegal or socially degrading activities (1%) among main income sources, two options that were hardly reported in other districts. Moreover, 15% of households are settled in critical shelters; however, families do not seem at risk of eviction.

In general, access to education is good (around 90% of children aged 6–11 years are attending school). One of the main vulnerabilities is the high share of households with at least one family member with a disability (24% versus 19% overall).

PRESENCE OF IN-CAMP IDPs

4 Camps in district

8,975 Households
(9.84% of total in-camp IDPs)

-1% Rate of Change
(May – Dec 2018)
IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

IDP MOVEMENT

The population movement can be defined as “fairly stationary”. Only 4% of IDPs have left since May 2018, mainly families from Khanaqin and Tikrit, while the number of IDPs from Al-Khalis and Al-Muqdadiya have increased. Nearly all households live in protracted displacement (96% fled before April 2015).

IDP INTENTIONS

Short/Medium Term (less than 12 months)

99% want to stay

Long Term (more than 12 months)

95% want to return

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

- 50% Khanaqin
- 27% Al-Muqdadiya
- 12% Al-Khalis
- 11% Other

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

- Homogeneous
- Fairly Homogeneous
- Heterogeneous

IDP LENGTH OF DISPLACEMENT

- 96% Protracted
- 72% Sept 2014 – Apr 2015
- 14% Aug 2014
- 14% Other

IDP ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

- 92% Arab Sunni
- 8% Arab Shia

IDP ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

- Homogeneous
- Fairly Homogeneous
- Heterogeneous
According to key informants, returns to the main locations of origin are obstructed, due to tribal conflict at the location of origin (mainly Al-Muqdadiya district and Saadiya and Jalawla sub-districts) as well as security clearance issues. Other top obstacles to return reported by key informants include house destruction/damage and lack of employment opportunities at origin (80% for both). When directly assessed, 80% of families mentioned fear/trauma as a key obstacle to return.

Key Obstacles to Return

- Social Cohesion
- House Destruction
- Livelihoods and Services
- Mental Health
- Security
- Fear / Trauma
- No Money
- Discrimination
- Lack of Security Forces
- Living Conditions Better in Displacement

The living conditions of displaced families in the district are very poor: the median monthly income per capita is IQD 46,429; nearly 55% of households are relying on their savings and 12% taking on loans or debts to supplement the revenues from employment – one of the main sources of income for 79% of HHs. Displaced families also reported a very low access to education (32% of children aged 6–11 years are not attending mandatory education). These findings reflect the poor public service provision in Diyala compared to other governorates. In addition, 57% of households are missing HLP documentation, 24% are headed by women and females are over-represented in Ba‘quba as they account for 55% of the population (vs. 49% overall).

Figure 1. Key Obstacles to Return
ERBIL DISTRICT, ERBIL
Out-of-Camp IDPs in Erbil District

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

Population movements in the district can be defined as “stationary”: only 8% of IDPs have moved out since May 2018, mainly IDPs originally from Kirkuk but also some families from Anbar.

IDP INTENTIONS

Short/Medium Term (less than 12 months)
83% want to stay

Long Term (more than 12 months)
90% want to return

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

37% Mosul 6% Kirkuk
24% Ramadi 7% Tikrit
8% Falluja 18% Other

IDP LENGTH OF DISPLACEMENT

79% Protracted
37% Jun – Jul 2014
17% Apr 2015 – Mar 2016
15% Pre-Jun 2014
11% Oct 2016 – Jul 2017
20% Other

IDP ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

83% Arab Sunni
13% Kurdish Sunni
3% Christian

DISTRICT IDP POPULATION

29,974 Households (14% of total out-of-camp IDPs)

RATE OF CHANGE IN IDP POPULATION

-8% IDPs in the District (May – Dec 2018)

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

Homogeneous
Fairly homogeneous
Heterogeneous

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

Homogeneous
Fairly homogeneous
Heterogeneous

IDP LENGTH OF DISPLACEMENT

Homogeneous
Fairly Homogeneous
Heterogeneous

IDP ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

Homogeneous
Fairly Homogeneous
Heterogeneous
ERBIL DISTRICT, ERBIL
Out-of-Camp IDPs in Erbil District

VULNERABILITIES

OBSTACLES TO RETURN

Delayed returns result from many interconnected reasons. In general, like other districts in KRI, families are staying because they can enjoy better living conditions in displacement than at home. Three quarters have had their home destroyed/damaged (73%), 46% still perceive their home location as “not safe” due to the lack of security forces, 39% as lacking employment or livelihood opportunities and 38% reported fear/trauma. In addition, key informants noted that many IDPs in Erbil still rely on humanitarian assistance (and are afraid to lose it).

Key Obstacles to Return

Social Cohesion
House Destruction
Mental Health
Livelihoods and Services
Security

CONDITIONS IN DISPLACEMENT

The median monthly income per capita in Erbil District is the second highest of all districts: IQD 116,667. Nevertheless in around 40% of households at least one member reported obstacles to find work. There are also high living costs, particularly as 88% of households are living in rented accommodation. As a result, 20% of households are taking on loans and debts, 22% are relying on savings and 15% receive assistance from relatives/friends. This can have an impact on their ability to access education (32% of children aged 6–11 years are not attending mandatory education).

PRESENCE OF IN-CAMP IDPs

1,216 Households
(1.33% of total in-camp IDPs)
-23% Rate of Change
(May – Dec 2018)
Kerbala can be considered as a “fairly dynamic” district. One in five families have left the district since the spring of 2018. All of the households originally from Al-Shikhan, and between 15% and 50% of those from Dabes, Mosul and Telafar. All IDPs are in a situation of protracted displacement, with most of them (90%) having fled in June and July 2014. Accordingly, their movements can be mainly linked with the initial advance of ISIL into Ninewa.

**IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN**

Kerbala

**IDP MOVEMENT**

**IDP INTENTIONS**

Short/Medium Term (less than 12 months)

78% want to stay

Long Term (more than 12 months)

58% want to return

**IDP ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION**

70% Turkmen Shia

15% Shabak Shia

8% Arab Shia

4% Turkmen Sunni

3% Arab Sunni

**OUT-OF-CAMP IDP CASELOAD**

2,469 Households

(1% of total out-of-camp IDPs)

**RATE OF CHANGE IN IDP POPULATION**

-21% IDPs in the District

(May – Dec 2018)

**IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN**

63% Telafar

13% Al-Hamdaniya

9% Tilkaif

15% Other

**IDP LENGTH OF DISPLACEMENT**

100% Protracted

89% Jun – Jul 2014

9% Pre-Jun 2016

2% Aug 2014

**IDP ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION**

Homogeneous

Fairly Homogeneous

Heterogeneous
VULNERABILITIES

According to key informants, the top three obstacles to return are destruction/damage of former residence, and lack of funds and economic prospects at origin. When directly assessed, households confirmed the loss of their former house and assets (86% and 42% respectively) together with the poor situation at the location the origin (around 20% reported the lack of services and the same share the lack of employment/livelihood opportunities) as obstacles to return.

Key Obstacles to Return

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Cohesion</th>
<th>Mental Health</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House Destruction</td>
<td>Livelihoods and Services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONDITIONS IN DISPLACEMENT

Families wishing to permanently relocate consider Kerbala as a safe location, and in most cases, they can also benefit from the presence of relatives/friends who moved with them. These IDPs may have chosen to displace into Kerbala because the host community is predominantly Shia. Only 10% of households mentioned the availability of housing and jobs. Living conditions of IDPs seem worse than the average: the median monthly income per capita is quite low (IQD 50,000) and obstacles to work were also reported by around one in five families (19%). Only 64% of households can count on employment as one of their main sources of income and as many as 46% of households are receiving support by family/friends. This puts these families at high risk of eviction, a major concern of 25% of households.

The district also hosts a high share of households reporting vulnerable members: 33% have at least one member of their family with disabilities and 22% are female-headed. In addition, all families are missing HLP documents.

PRESENCE OF IN-CAMP IDPs

No in-camp IDPs
KIRKUK DISTRICT, KIRKUK
Out-of-Camp IDPs in Kirkuk District

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

The situation can be defined as “fairly stationary”: 18% of IDPs have moved out since May 2018, mostly families from Baiji, Daquq and Al-Muqadiya. Most of these IDPs originally displaced between September 2014 and March 2016. An additional 16% left due to movements along the Mosul corridor and 11% displaced during the change in the security and administration configuration in the disputed territories.

IDP MOVEMENT

IDP INTENTIONS

Short/Medium Term (less than 12 months)
61% want to stay

Long Term (more than 12 months)
70% want to return

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

45% Al-Hawiga 9% Mosul
13% Tooz 22% Other
11% Kirkuk

IDP LENGTH OF DISPLACEMENT

60% Protracted
19% Sept 2014 – Apr 2015
18% Apr 2015 – Mar 2016
16% Oct 2016 – Jul 2017
13% Post-Mar 2016
12% Jun – Jul 2014
11% Post-Jul 2017
11% Other

IDP ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

88% Arab Sunni
6% Turkmen Sunni
4% Turkmen Shia
2% Arab Shia

IDP DISTRICT IDP POPULATION

14,065 Households
(7% of total out-of-camp IDPs)

RATE OF CHANGE IN IDP POPULATION

-18% IDPs in the District
(May – Dec 2018)

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

45% Al-Hawiga 9% Mosul
13% Tooz 22% Other
11% Kirkuk

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

District of Displacement
Number of IDPs per districts of origin

Low Recipient
Medium Recipient
High Recipient

Stationary
Fairly Stationary
Fairly Dynamic
Dynamic

Homogeneous
Fairly Homogeneous
Heterogeneous

Homogeneous
Fairly Homogeneous
Heterogeneous

Homogeneous
Fairly Homogeneous
Heterogeneous
According to key informants, security issues in the location of origin and destruction/damage of former homes are the main obstacles to return. When directly assessed, families mainly reported house destruction/damage (57%), fear/trauma (49%) and the presence of mines in their location of origin (33%). Another issue may be the lack of documents: 46% of households are missing HLP documents and 14% civil documentation.

Key Obstacles to Return

Social Cohesion

- House Destruction
- Mental Health
- Livelihoods and Services
- Security

Figure 1. Key Obstacles to Return

Living conditions of displaced families in the district are difficult. Although nearly 90% of households rely on employment as one of their main sources of revenue, their median monthly income per capita is only IQD 58,333. Moreover, obstacles to work were reported by around one third of families.

The low median income may indicate that much of this income is generated by minors who are working. This hypothesis is confirmed by the high share of children and adolescents aged 12–14 and 15–17 years who are not attending formal education (32% and 61% respectively). Nearly one in five families is female-headed, one in four has a family member with disabilities and one in three has more than two to three dependents. Finally, 10% of children aged 0–5 years have not been vaccinated against measles and polio.

PRESENCE OF IN-CAMP IDPs

No in-camp IDPs
AKRE DISTRICT, NINEWA

Out-of-Camp IDPs in Akre District

IDP MOVEMENT

The district can be defined as having a "stationary" population as only 5% of IDPs have left since the spring of 2018. However, the composition of IDPs has changed. Families originally from Sinjar, Telafar, Tikrtaif and Hatra have mostly moved out, those from Al-Hamdaniya have stayed, while there has been an increase in the number of IDPs from Mosul and they now account for over 80% of all IDPs. Delayed returns are strongly linked to the wave of ISIL-related violence in the summer of 2014 (when nearly all IDPs fled).

IDP INTENTIONS

Short/Medium Term (less than 12 months)

- 76% want to stay

Long Term (more than 12 months)

- 81% want to return

1 The information contained in this report is for general information purposes only. Names and boundaries on DTM information products do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.
AKRE DISTRICT, NINEWA
Out-of-Camp IDPs in Akre District

VULNERABILITIES

According to key informants, fear due to the changed ethno-religious composition and lack of security/safety in their place of origin are among the top three obstacles to return, together with home destruction/damage. During household surveys, families mentioned fear/trauma, lack of security forces at the location of origin and the presence of mines (65%, 65% and 30%) as other obstacles to return.

Key Obstacles to Return
- Social Cohesion
- House Destruction
- Livelihoods and Services
- Mental Health
- Security
- Lack of Security Forces
- Presence of Mines
- House Damaged / Destroyed
- Discrimination

CONDITIONS IN DISPLACEMENT

The living conditions of IDPs in Akre appear to be better than average. The median monthly income per capita is IQD 75,000, in 84% of households one of the primary sources of income is from employment and obstacles to find work are not common (12%). Only 5% of households are currently settled in critical shelters, while 79% live in rented accommodation (with a long-term rental agreement).

Nevertheless, IDPs in Akre still display a number of vulnerabilities. The lack of HLP documentation appears to be one of the most important, affecting 55% of households. There is a greater-than-average number of female-headed households (26%) and, accordingly, of households reporting more than two to three dependents (33%). This finding has another important consequence that may explain the high share of income from employment: as much as 29% of children aged 12–14 years and 61% of those aged 15–17 years are not enrolled in formal education.

PRESENCE OF IN-CAMP IDPs

2 Camps
in district
324 Households
(0.36% of total in-camp IDPs)
-4% Rate of Change
(May – Dec 2018)
AL-SHIKHAN DISTRICT, NINEWA

Out-of-Camp IDPs in Al-Shikhan District

IDP MOVEMENT

In terms of IDP movement, the situation in the district is “fairly stationary”: 11% of IDPs have left since May 2018, mainly those originally from the disputed districts of Tilkiaf and Al-Hamdaniya. Families from Sinjar have mostly stayed, while the number of IDPs from Mosul has increased (+25%, 439 households) and they now represent the main group.

IDP INTENTIONS

Short/Medium Term (less than 12 months)

99% want to stay

Long Term (more than 12 months)

80% want to return

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

IDP ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

38% Yazidi
32% Kurdish
21% Shabak
9% Other

Homogeneous
Fairly Homogeneous
Heterogeneous

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According to key informants, lack of security and fear due to the changed ethno-religious composition at their location of origin are the major obstacles to return, together with house destruction/damage. During household assessments, families mentioned the lack of security and fear/truma (53% and 41%) and then lack of livelihood, lack of basic services, presence of mines, and discrimination (around 25% each) as obstacles to return. Nearly 70% of households are missing HLP documents and 24% have had their former residence destroyed. This high percentage of IDPs missing HLP documentation may be because Yazidis make up the largest segment of IDPs in the district and in general did not have HLP documentation before the conflict due to long-standing discrimination.

The impact of protracted displacement is reflected in living conditions of IDPs: the median monthly income per capita is IQD 50,000. Even though 85% of households cite employment as one of their main income sources, obstacles to finding work are widespread (reported by 34% of households). In fact, nearly 20% of households are relying on their savings and another 20% are taking on loans or debts. It is also important to note that one in four families currently live in critical shelters.
The situation in Mosul can be defined as “stationary”: only 8% of IDPs have left since May 2018. While there are returns, these are only to the eastern part of the city, which was the first area to be retaken from ISIL (January 2017). The eastern neighbourhoods of Mosul City host more than half of the IDPs in the district, with the remaining located mainly in the other side of the city. Very few IDPs are in the more rural subdistricts of Mosul. The physical consequences of the conflict in the city, especially in the western neighbourhoods, triggered a significant intra-city displacement towards the eastern side, which suffered to a lesser extent the destruction of housing and public infrastructure. In addition, Mosul District includes a very extended area consisting of the subdistricts of Hammam al-Aleel, Shoura, Muhalabiya, Qayyara, and Bashiq. Displacement from these areas has been significant, with many returns still pending.
OBSTACLES TO RETURN

According to both key informants and families, the widespread home destruction/damage, coupled with the lack of employment/livelihood opportunities and services at the location of origin, are the main obstacles to return. More than 40% of families also reported lack of money as an obstacle.

Key Obstacles to Return

- Social Cohesion
- House Destruction
- Livelihoods and Services
- Mental Health
- Security

Figure 1. Key Obstacles to Return

CONDITIONS IN DISPLACEMENT

Living conditions are difficult in Mosul. Families have a median monthly income per capita of IQD 40,000, 5% of HHs reporting a monthly family income per capita below 20,000 IQD. Barriers to employment are common: in one third of households at least one family member reported obstacles to find work. As a result, 14% of families are taking on loans and debts and 17% are at risk of evictions. Over 60% are also missing HLP documents.

About 35% of children aged 6–11 years are not attending mandatory education. Around 20% of households exhibit one vulnerability: either they are female headed, have one family member with disabilities, or have more than two or three dependents.

PRESENCE OF IN-CAMP IDPs

10 Camps in district

32160 Households (35.26% of total in-camp IDPs)

-5% Rate of Change (May – Dec 2018)
The situation in Sinjar can be defined as “fairly stationary”: the number of IDPs has slightly increased (+5%) since the spring of 2018; however, the composition of the displaced population has changed. Around one third of IDPs from Sinjar have left the location of displacement, while those originally from Al-Ba’aj have arrived from other places of displacement but have not yet returned to their locations of origin.

All IDPs in Sinjar district are Yazidi and have been displaced for more than four years. More than half of them are currently displaced in several locations within Sinuni subdistricts, with other relevant pockets in Sinjar Mountain and Sinjar Centre. Returns in the southern parts of the district, in Sinjar Centre and Qairawan subdistrict, remain very low due to security concerns and the lack of reconciliation efforts between the tribes.
SINJAR DISTRICT, NINEWA
Out-of-Camp IDPs in Sinjar District

VULNERABILITIES

According to key informants, the main obstacles to the IDPs’ return are lack of security forces and house destruction/damage. When directly assessed, families confirmed these findings with 70% of households reporting the presence of mines and 58% house destruction. Around half of families also mentioned fear/trauma as an obstacle to return. Among families willing to locally resettle (14% in the long term), security and common ethno-religious affiliation of the host community are the main pull factors.

Key Obstacles to Return

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Figure 1. Key Obstacles to Return

CONDITIONS IN DISPLACEMENT

Living conditions in Sinjar are very poor. Families have one of the lowest median monthly incomes per capita of all districts (IQD 24,698), 61% of HHs reported a monthly family income per capita below 20,000 IQD. Barriers to employment were reported by nearly all families (87%), only 55% generate income through employment, 36% are taking on loans and/or debts and 15% are living in critical shelters. However, these families receive support: 85% are hosted by other families, 12% receive money from relatives/friends, 6% from NGOs/charities and 3% from social services.

It is also important to note that all families are missing HLP documentation (and one in four are missing civil documents). This is a widespread issue in Sinjar, well known and previously documented. These households are also more likely to have family members with disabilities (33% versus an overall average of 19%). As many as 46% of children aged 6–11 years are not attending mandatory education. According to key informants, at the time of the assessment, many schools in Sinjar were not open due to damage/destruction.

PRESENCE OF IN-CAMP IDPs

No in-camp IDPs
IDP MOVEMENT

The population movement in the district is “dynamic” and blocked returns (one of the main obstacles to return according to key informants in the spring of 2018) are becoming less of an issue. One third of families have moved out since the spring of 2018: over 80% of IDPs from Al-Ba’aj, over 60% of those from Mosul, 40% of those from Telafer and around 20% of those from Sinjar. It should nonetheless be noted that these movements do not necessarily mean that families have returned to their location of origin – it is highly likely that families from Al-Ba’aj and from west Mosul have embarked on continued displacement (as returns to these areas are very complicated). In addition, according to key informants, returns to the western side of Rabbia and Ayadhiya subdistricts (in Telafer District) remain subject to restrictions due to community tensions, particularly related to the alleged participation of some members of these tribes in the violations against the neighbouring Yazidi population.
According to key informants, destruction/damage of houses, lack of security, no job opportunities and fear due to the ethno-religious change in their location of origin are the main obstacles to return. When directly assessed, families confirmed these findings, mentioning destruction/damage of homes (64%) as well as discrimination (47%), fear/trauma (36%), lack of security forces (21%) and presence of mines (12%) in their location of origin as obstacles to return.

In terms of the living conditions of IDPs, the median monthly income per capita is very low (IQD 25,000). 46% of HHs reported a monthly family income per capita below 20,000 IQD. Moreover, 60% of households reported obstacles to find work and only 56% reported that employment is one of their main income sources, one of the lowest figures nationwide. Telafar also has the highest proportion of IDPs taking on loans/debts (51%) and spending their savings (37%). Nearly a quarter of families are being financially supported by relatives/ friends (23%); 11% are settled in critical shelters.

In addition, around 70% are missing HLP documentation, and one in four families is at risk of eviction. Around half the households exhibit at least one vulnerability: 17% are female headed; 26% have one family member with disabilities and 22% have more than two or three dependents (versus 17%, 19% and 18% overall). Access to education is very low: 37% of children aged 6–11 years are not attending mandatory education (versus 21% overall).

**PRESENCE OF IN-CAMP IDPs**

No in-camp IDPs
TILKAIF DISTRICT, NINEWA
Out-of-Camp IDPs in Tilkaif District

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

The population movement in the district can be defined as "fairly dynamic" as around one third of IDPs have moved out since May 2018 (-28%). This includes mainly families originally from Mosul and, to a lesser extent, Sinjar.

A significant proportion of the intra-district IDPs consist of the Christian population originally from Tilkaif Centre and currently displaced in majority Christian locations such as Tel Asquf and Alqosh. The district remains divided with the southern half controlled by the ISF and the northern half by the KSF, where these two locations are situated. Given this military division, returns to Tilkaif Centre and Tel Asquf had reopened but no new wave of returns was recorded.

IDP MOVEMENT

DISTRICT IDP POPULATION

-28% IDPs in the District
(2018 May – Dec)

RATE OF CHANGE IN IDP POPULATION

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

IDP LENGTH OF DISPLACEMENT

52% Protracted
49% Aug 2014
34% Oct 2016 – Jul 2017
14% Post-Jul 2017
3% Other

IDP ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

56% Arab Sunni
23% Yazidi
17% Christian
4% Kurdish Sunni

IDP INTENTIONS

47% want to stay
77% want to return
TILKAIF DISTRICT, NINEWA
Out-of-Camp IDPs in Tilkaif District

VULNERABILITIES

According to key informants, the main obstacles to return seem linked to the lack of security and services in their place of origin and widespread house destruction/damage. When directly assessed, families stated house destruction/damage (56%) and lack of services (19%) together with fear/trauma (33%), assets stolen/damaged (22%) and lack of money (21%) as obstacles to return. As many as 84% of households do not have any HLP documents. This situation is likely to be prevalent among IDPs from Sinjar, as lack of property is a well-known and previously documented issue in the area, but also for Sunni Arabs and Christians internally displaced from other areas of Tilkaif.

OBSTACLES TO RETURN

According to key informants, the main obstacles to return seem linked to the lack of security and services in their place of origin and widespread house destruction/damage. When directly assessed, families stated house destruction/damage (56%) and lack of services (19%) together with fear/trauma (33%), assets stolen/damaged (22%) and lack of money (21%) as obstacles to return. As many as 84% of households do not have any HLP documents. This situation is likely to be prevalent among IDPs from Sinjar, as lack of property is a well-known and previously documented issue in the area, but also for Sunni Arabs and Christians internally displaced from other areas of Tilkaif.

Key Obstacles to Return

- Social Cohesion
- House Destruction
- Livelihoods and Services
- Mental Health
- Security

Figure 1. Key Obstacles to Return

CONDITIONS IN DISPLACEMENT

Living conditions for IDPs in Tilkaif are difficult. Families have a median monthly income per capita of IQD 33,333, revenues are often insufficient (23% of HHs are taking on loans/debts and 12% spending their savings) and barriers to employment are frequent – in 39% of households at least one member reported obstacles to find work. There are 22% of households living in critical shelters and 11% are at risk of eviction.

Nevertheless, many families receive support: 43% are hosted by other families, 12% receive money from relatives/friends, 9% from social services and 1% receive cash assistance. Compared to other districts, a very low share of female-headed households were assessed (5%). Around one in four households have at least one family member with disabilities and one in five more than two or three dependents. Around one third of children aged 6-11 years are not attending mandatory education.

PRESENCE OF IN-CAMP IDPs

- 1 Camps in district
- 95 Households (0.1% of total in-camp IDPs)
- -41% Rate of Change (May – Dec 2018)

Districts of Origin

- 62% Mosul
- 32% Tilkaif
- 4% Sinjar
- 2% Al-Hamdaniya
Samarra can be described as a “fairly stationary” district as the situation has not changed much since the spring of 2018. The 17% of IDPs who have left are mainly from Balad.

**IDP INTENTIONS**

**Short/Medium Term** (less than 12 months)

- 69% want to stay

**Long Term** (more than 12 months)

- 100% want to return
According to key informants, the main obstacle to return – in addition to widespread house destruction/damage and lack of employment/livelihood opportunities – is the blockage of IDPs by security forces, which affects groups from Balad and Samarra. IDPs from the sub-districts of Yathrib and Markaz-Al-Balad are particularly at risk as tribal and ethno-religious issues were reported at their location of origin. When directly assessed, 37% of families also reported lack of money as an obstacle to return.

Key Obstacles to Return

- Social Cohesion
- House Destruction
- Livelihoods and Services
- Mental Health
- Security
- Security

Figure 1. Key Obstacles to Return

Although nearly all families are living in a situation of protracted displacement, their living conditions are better than the average: their median monthly income per capita is IQD 88,750 and 89% of households can count on employment among main sources of income. However, obstacles to work are widespread (reported by 28% of households), 19% of families are relying on savings and 13% are taking on loans/debts.

The main source of concern is that 41% of households are living in critical shelters, such as unfinished/abandoned buildings, informal settlements and schools. In addition, nearly 40% of children aged 6-11 years are not attending mandatory education and 19% of children under five years have not been vaccinated against measles.

PRESENCE OF IN-CAMP IDPs

No in-camp IDPs
TIKRIT DISTRICT, SALAH AL-DIN
Out-of-Camp IDPs in Tikrit District

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

The population movement in the district can be defined as “dynamic”. Since May 2018, 42% of IDPs have left and outflows are continuing (although at a slightly slower pace, -11% between October and December 2018).

IDP INTENTIONS

Short/Medium Term (less than 12 months)
47% want to stay

Long Term (more than 12 months)
100% want to return
VULNERABILITIES

According to key informants, the main obstacles to return seem linked to the lack of economic prospects and security at the place of origin, coupled with the fear of losing humanitarian assistance. Moreover, returns to 81% of locations of Baiji and 98% of location of Al-Shirqat – which are the districts of origin of 73% of IDPs – are still obstructed due to security as well as community and tribal issues. When directly assessed, most families reported also house destruction/damage (70%) as an obstacle to return.

Key Obstacles to Return

- Social Cohesion
- House Destruction
- Livelihoods and Services
- Mental Health
- Security
- Security

 CONDITIONS IN DISPLACEMENT

Living conditions of IDPs in the district are slightly lower than the average – their median monthly income per capita is IQD 50,000. Displaced families in Tikrit were also more likely to report obstacles to work (44% of households) and, as main sources of income, using up savings (20%), taking loans/debts (27%) selling humanitarian assistance (5%), of household items (1%) and even illegal or socially degrading activities (1%). Around 45% of households are settled in critical shelters and 28% are at risk of eviction (one of the highest figures of all districts). Hence, 1% of families are considering moving to another displacement location.

Other sources of concern are the high share of female-headed households (33% versus an overall average of 17%). In addition, 20% of households have one family member with disabilities, and 31% of children under two years of age have not received the Penta3 vaccine.
TOOZ DISTRICT, SALAH AL-DIN
Out-of-Camp IDPs in Tooz District

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

Tooz is classified as a "stationary" district: only 9% of IDPs have moved out since May 2018 – mainly those from Mosul and from within the district. However, a small influx of IDPs moving while still in displacement from Ba‘quba, Daquq and Ramadi was recorded, mostly Arab Sunnis.

Dynamics in Tooz have been greatly impacted by severe social tensions among the different ethno-religious communities. In addition, competition between rival security groups remains high and several clashes between them have been recorded since ISIL was expelled in 2016. The IDP population currently assessed is hosted mainly in Tooz Centre specifically in the Kurdish-majority neighbourhoods within this mixed town. This indicates that the displaced population is likely fleeing mixed areas and concentrating in places where their ethno-religious group is in the majority. In addition, returns to most areas in Suleiman Beg and Amerli subdistricts remain blocked by security forces.

IDP MOVEMENT

DISTRICT IDP POPULATION

4,933 Households
(2% of total out-of-camp IDPs)

RATE OF CHANGE IN IDP POPULATION

-9% IDPs in the District
(May – Dec 2018)

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN

88% Tooz
2% Mosul
4% Al-Khalis
3% Other
3% Ramadi

IDP LENGTH OF DISPLACEMENT

95% Protracted
61% Aug 2014
25% Jun – Jul 2014
14% Other

IDP ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

76% Arab Sunni
22% Turkmen Sunni
2% Kurdish Sunni

IDP INTENTIONS

Short/Medium Term (less than 12 months)
38% want to stay
56% undecided

Long Term (more than 12 months)
99% want to return
TOOZ DISTRICT, SALAH AL-DIN
Out-of-Camp IDPs in Tooz District

VULNERABILITIES

According to key informants, the main obstacles to return are home destruction/damage, lack of security and employment/livelihood opportunities at the place of origin and, to a lesser extent, fear due to the ethno-religious change. When directly assessed, families confirmed widespread house damage/destruction (85%) together with lack/loss of HLP documentation (58%) and loss/damage to assets (27%) as obstacles to return. As for security, around 40% reported the presence of mines, 22% the lack of security forces at the location of origin, 15% mentioned fear/trauma and 10% discrimination. Returns to Suleiman Beg and Amerli subdistricts in Tooz remain blocked.

OBSTACLES TO RETURN

According to key informants, the main obstacles to return are home destruction/damage, lack of security and employment/livelihood opportunities at the place of origin and, to a lesser extent, fear due to the ethno-religious change. When directly assessed, families confirmed widespread house damage/destruction (85%) together with lack/loss of HLP documentation (58%) and loss/damage to assets (27%) as obstacles to return. As for security, around 40% reported the presence of mines, 22% the lack of security forces at the location of origin, 15% mentioned fear/trauma and 10% discrimination. Returns to Suleiman Beg and Amerli subdistricts in Tooz remain blocked.

CONDITIONS IN DISPLACEMENT

Living conditions for IDPs in Tooz are similar to the overall average. Families have a median monthly income per capita of IQD 58,572, employment is one of the main sources of income for around 80% of households, very few (1%) are taking on loans/debts, only 8% are spending their savings and 11% are financially supported by relatives/friends.

However, 1% of households are coping by selling household assets and 1% are getting income from illegal or socially degrading activities, two options that were hardly reported among main sources of income in other districts. Around 14% of families are also living in critical shelters.

The most striking vulnerability is the high percentage of families with more than two or three dependents (40%). IDPs in Tooz are the youngest of all districts – with 48% of the population younger than 15 years (it is 40% overall). This vulnerability has an important impact on access to education: one third of children aged 6–11 years are not attending mandatory education. In addition, 26% of households have at least one family member with a disability.

PRESENCE OF IN-CAMP IDPs

No in-camp IDPs
KALAR DISTRICT, SULAIMANIYAH
Out-of-Camp IDPs in Kalar District

IDP MOVEMENT
The first IDPs arrived before June 2014, fleeing intense fighting in Anbar (12%), but were joined shortly after by those escaping the spread of the conflict to Ninewa, Diyala, Salah al-Din and Kirkuk. One in five families currently in the district are also recent IDPs who fled the disputed territories after October 2017 due to changes in the security and administration configuration. Population movements in the district can be defined as “fairly stationary”: 13% of IDPs have left since May 2018 (mainly IDPs originally from Tooz, and to a lesser extent from Al-Musayab and Mada’in).

IDP INTENTIONS
Short/Medium Term (less than 12 months)
- 87% want to stay

Long Term (more than 12 months)
- 100% want to stay

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN
- Khanaqin: 37%
- Al-Muqdadiya: 19%
- Tooz: 14%
- Other: 30%

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN PROFILE

IDP LENGTH OF DISPLACEMENT
- 70% Protracted
- 24% Jun – Jul 2014
- 19% Post-Jul 2014
- 17% Sept 2014 – Apr 2015
- 12% Pre-Jun 2014
- 28% Other

IDP ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION
- Arab Sunni: 53%
- Kurdish Sunni: 46%
- Turkmen Sunni: 1%

DISTRICT IDP POPULATION
- 3,761 Households
- 2% of total out-of-camp IDPs

RATE OF CHANGE IN IDP POPULATION
- 13% IDPs in the District
- May – Dec 2018

IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN PROFILE

Homogeneous
Fairly Homogeneous
Heterogeneous
According to key informants, all families are staying in the district in the long term because they can enjoy safer living conditions and better services than they would at home. Intentions in the medium term are consistent and only 2% of families plan to leave the location within the next 12 months. During household surveys, families mentioned lack of security in their area of origin, fear/trauma and discrimination as the top three obstacles to their return.

**Key Obstacles to Return**

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<th>Security</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House Destruction</td>
<td>Livelihoods and Services</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Figure 1. Key Obstacles to Return

**Conditions in Displacement**

Similar to other IDPs settled in KRI, living conditions of the displaced population seem better than the average: the median monthly income per capita is slightly higher, with IQD 81,667, only 3% of families are taking on debts/loans (versus 19%), obstacles to find work are also less frequent (17% versus 28%) and access to education is widespread (only 9% of children aged 6–11 years are not attending education). These households also exhibit lower rates of vulnerabilities than most districts: 13% are female headed, 12% have at least one family member with disabilities and 13% have more than two or three dependents.

**Presence of In-Camp IDPs**

1 Camps in district

338 Households (0.37% of total in-camp IDPs)

-14% Rate of Change (May – Dec 2018)

Districts of Origin

- 42% Al-Musayab
- 13% Al-Muqdadiya
- 11% Balad
- 11% Al-Fares
- 8% Falluja
SULAYMANIH DISTRICT, SULAYMANIH

Out-of-Camp IDPs in Sulaymaniyah District

**IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN**

Population movements in the district can be defined as "stationary". However, it is important to note that the number of IDPs has slightly increased since spring 2018 (+7%). The district hosts a very mixed population in terms of places of origin: the first IDPs arrived before June 2014 because of fighting in Anbar (7%), but were soon joined by those escaping the spreading of the conflict to Ninewa, Diyala, Salah al-Din and Kirkuk. One in five families are also recent IDPs who fled the disputed territories after October 2017 due to changes in the security and administrative configuration.

**IDP MOVEMENT**

**IDP INTENTIONS**

Short/Medium Term (less than 12 months)

- 80% want to stay

Long Term (more than 12 months)

- 92% plan to stay

**DISTRICT IDP POPULATION**

- 13,178 Households (6% of total out-of-camp IDPs)

**RATE OF CHANGE IN IDP POPULATION**

- +7% IDPs in the District (May – Dec 2018)

**IDP DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN**

- Falluja: 12%
- Ramadi: 8%
- Kirkuk: 10%
- Mahmoudia: 10%
- Other: 60%

**IDP LENGTH OF DISPLACEMENT**

- 65% Protracted
- 19% Jun – July 2014
- 19% Post-Jul 2017
- 19% Post-Jul 2014
- 16% Sept 2014 – Apr 2015
- 11% Post-Apr 2015
- 12% Aug 2014
- 11% Other

**IDP ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION**

- 81% Arab Sunni
- 15% Kurdish Sunni
- 4% Yazidi
SULAYMANIYAH DISTRICT, SULAYMANIYAH
Out-of-Camp IDPs in Sulaymaniyah District

VULNERABILITIES

Over 70% of families reported fear/trauma as the main reason for staying – the highest figure of all districts. Most families agree that their location of origin is not secure enough, mainly due to the lack of security forces (47% of households), when compared to the district of Sulaymaniyah. Nearly three quarters of families do not have HLP documentation and 42% reported that their former home is destroyed.

Key Obstacles to Return
- Social Cohesion
- House Destruction
- Mental Health
- Livelihoods and Services
- Security

Conditions in Displacement

The living conditions of IDPs in Sulaymaniyah are close to the national average: families have a median monthly income per capita of IQD 64,286, three quarters of families rely on employment and 12% on pensions as one of their main sources of income. However, as in other districts of KRI, there are frequent obstacles to work (33%) and rent expenses may be exhausting the income of families (99% are living in rented accommodation) as 20% of HHs are taking on loans/debt; and 13% are relying on support from families/friends.

Access to education is fairly good, with around 15% of children aged 6–11 years not attending mandatory education, and nearly all children have received the vaccine against measles and polio (97% both) and the Penta3 vaccine (90%). However, one in four households has at least one family member with disabilities (the national figure is 19%).

Prevalence of In-Camp IDPs

2 Camps in district

2,747 Households (3.01% of total in-camp IDPs)

-1% Rate of Change (May – Dec 2018)
PROTRACTED DISPLACEMENT STUDY:

AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE MAIN DISTRICTS OF DISPLACEMENT

IOM IRAQ